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A follow-up on visual spoofing. It’s even worse, it’s on purpose

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You are not going to believe this! It appears that IE7 implements the IDN support and the Unicode to ASCII conversion following the spec (thanks to Michel Suignard for pointing this out). Yeah, I was surprised too. Apparently Firefox approaches the problem creatively and gets... well... over-secured (is that even a word?). How so?

Well, it all started a long time ago when Europeans came up with an idea of adapting a known character set (that is Latin) to represent sounds of entirely exotic languages (Vietnamese for instance). It seemed a great idea back then — so cosmopolitan and all — but now it turns out it's not that awesome after all.

To cut the long story short we ended up with a modern Vietnamese alphabet containing a meaningful character of "y with dot below" () and couple of other characters that reassemble regular ASCII characters, just in the same fashion as, say, umlauts do in western Europe languages. The only difference is that we know about umlauts and we learnt to expect them unlike some weird "y with dot below". It simply leaves us in a place where we cannot treat Vietnamese alphabet any different than we do treat any other and that’s exactly why IE7-ish way of failing to convert a word paỵpal into ASCII is pretty much justifiable — seeing the letter is what Vietnamese people are expecting to see, not the xn-- weirdo something (it's worth mentioning that IE7 properly converts the letter-diacritic pair into a one Unicode character representing the same glyph thus normalising the URL).

OK, so now what? How are we going to defend against it? And even more importantly — how are we going to defend our users against scams that use this method? Well, one way that's always good and never sufficient, is to increase user awareness. After all, it's pretty straightforward to look for the IDN button at the right to the address bar. But is it really? For your parents, grandma or your artistic-minded girlfriend or boyfriend?

And could we expect registrars to forbid registering certain domain names reassembling trademarked names? Or, if such domains get registered, to feed them into anti-phishing databases? Well, first of all, it's not their business. Their business is to register domains and make their customers happy (i.e. not have their domains submitted to the anti-phishing lists for a start). And secondly, maintenance of such a black-list looks like a huge load of trouble. So, my guess here is that this problem is not going to be fixed on the registrar level in any foreseeable future.

But, what we're left with is a way deeper problem. The problem of maintaining a healthy balance between features (like everybody having their domain names set in type as expected in their language) on one side and security (like people not having to worry about fonts and characters that they have never even suspected exist to impersonate some ASCII characters) on the other. What is the good balance? It seems like there is not much of a consensus in this. Surely there are two opposite ways: Firefox goes for security, when IE7 gives people their well-deserved funny characters everywhere possible.

Which is better? Decide for yourselves.

Could it be done better? How about allowing only those non-ASCII characters that are used in a language that a user’s browser is localised for and converting everything else to ASCII representation? This appears to be quite a reasonable balance — we’ll see if it makes its way to the web browsers at some point or not.

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Comments (2)

Dave:

Certainly an interesting thought and yet I can't help but think that it's all a storm in a teacup.

99% of all phishing emails I get (and yes, I DO look at them - call me weird... they're fascinating.) make no attempt to spoof or even imitate the domain they are phishing for.

Will IDNs change that ? I can't say for sure but even if it does, I don't think it will affect phishing's success rates. I suspect that the people who fall for phishing attempts barely look at the address bar or the URL of the link before they click on it.

Time will tell.

I guess it will.

I think you have a good point that people who fall for this are not very likely to be so cautious as to check if the URL looks anything familiar, but I guess this is the question of education. We could argue if it’s easier to educate people to not click on any links that they find in emails the origin of which they’re not sure or couldn’t confirm (and we both know how fascinating phishing emails may be and how someone might be tempted to check out where the link will get them) or to carefully check where the link leads before they actually click it, but I don’t think any of us actually knows the answer. So, I guess it is all about making it a wee bit harder for bad guys.

Also, personally I would like to think that *some day* more people will learn to be careful when clicking random links. And that’s exactly when the Unicode-based visual spoofing would come in handy for phishers, so, it would be good to have it under control by then, whenever it would be. Hopefully before hell freezing over and pigs learning to fly...

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This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on October 24, 2007 1:42 AM.

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